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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
STELLA FELICE GIGLIOTTI, 
Plaintiff and Appellarn;t: 
vs. 
LEOPOLDO ALBERGO, 
Defenda(fl)t and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
This action sh'ould be -considered, at least in part, 
with the c.ase of Albergo vs. Gigliotti, et al., decided by 
this ~Court on Decem·ber 12, 19'38, ...... Utah ...... , 85 P. (2d) 
107. This ease was one involving the foreclosure of a 
pul'lported mortgag,e .on the property in favor of Al-
bergo and in which foreclosure proceeding, he neglected 
to make ·Stella F'elice Gigliotti, the present appellant, 
one of the parties defendant. It is claimed that appel-
lant wa~s in possession of the real property at the time 
of the forecl~osure suit and the wife of Ross Gigliotti, 
who wa.s made a pa.rty to the Albergo suit. It is also 
claimed that app.ellant was the owner of the property 
by reason of the unrecorded deed. In the main, this 
Court is ·called upon to determine the rights of a wife 
of .a party defendant to a fore-closure suit omitted there-
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from as a party defendant and regardle•ss ·of, her deed, 
had an inchoate interest in ·the property sought to be 
foreclosed. · 
BTATE~ENT O·F. CA1S·E. 
It Inight he ·eonvenient to briefly' review t·he undis-
puted facts as shown from t:he testimony adduced and 
from ·the v.ari'ous exhibits in the ·case. We summarize 
the ·salient point·s as follorws: 
'1. ·O·n August 22, 19'27 F'elice W. and Maria Gig-
liotti (not the plaintiff), husband and wife, mortgaged 
the property tq the res-pondent, A]bergo. The mortgage 
was filed for re.cord and recorded in the office of the 
County R.ecorder of C:arhon County on August 28, 1927. 
('Exhibit "A"). 
N·ote: Exhibit ''A'' referred to throughout this brief 
consists of the file involving the foreelosure action en-
ti tied in this court as Case No. 4563, wherein Leopoldo 
Albergo, the present defendant, was plaintiff and F'elice 
W. Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti, husband and wife, and 
Rqsario Gigliotti, Ross Gigliotti, Shell ·Oil C·omp.any, a 
corporation, and W. H. Bintz Company, a corporation, 
were defendants and in which case a .decree of· fore-
. ' ' 
closure was entered in .fa.vor of Alhergo and against the 
' I ' • • • ' 
named defendants and whi·ch decree was affirmed with 
some modifi-cation by this Court on December 12,' 1938 
(Albergo v. Gigliotti, et al., 85 Pa.c. (2d) 107). This de-
cision holds that R6·sario or Ro·ss Gigliotti, one and the 
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same person, had an interest in the property by reason 
of an existing contract of purchase th~reto and.which in-
terest a.nd -contra~t prevented hin1 from .setting up aQ.-
Yersely to the interest of the mortgagee a tax deed ac-
quired from ·Carbon County. 
2. On Aug11st. 31, 1931, Felice W. 1G~gliotti and 
Maria Gigliotti, husband and "\vife, as vendors entered 
into a c.ontraet ·of sale with Rosario or R9ss Gigliotti as 
purchaser whereby the vendors .agreed t.o ·.sell and ~~e 
purchaser. agreed .to buy for the eonsideration therein 
named the property involved in this :controversy and 
which ·COntract WaS recorded in the year 19'31 irtthe· of-
fice of the County Recorder of Carbon County in Book 
30, page 270. (E·xhibit ''A'') 
. . . 
3. ~The appellant in this action, IS:tella F·elice .Gig~ 
liotti, wa·s. married to the Rosario or Ro:ss Gigliotti men-
tioned ·above ·On June 1, 1929 at D~vis County, .State of 
Utah ( 1Exh~bit "B'') and immediately thereafter moyed 
into the property in 9uestion where she lived with her 
husband ·continuously up to the p-resent time.. (·Tr .. pp. 
26-27; Ahs. p. 27) 
4. The mortgage foreclosure action wa.s commeneed 
.on. July 18, 19-36. A lis,. pH~dens was .. recorded in the ~f­
:fi~ce of the \County Recorder on the same day. (Exhibit 
"A:'') 
5. The appellant in the present action, the wife 
of Rosario or Ros·s Gigliotti, since .June 1, 19·29 has been 
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r'esiding on the property and was not mHde a. party de-
fendant to the foreclosure suit. (Exhibit ''A'') 
6. On July 17, 19·3'6, the day before the commence-
ment .of the forHclosure suit, there 'vas made, ,exe,cuted 
and delivered to the appellant a quit claim deed to the 
property from Felice W. Gigliotti, Maria. Gigliotti and 
Rosario or Ross Gigliotti as grantors. (Defendant's Ex-
hibit 1, p. 5-3) 
7. 'The note secured by the mortgage subsequently 
foreclosed and given by appellant's father-in-law and 
mother-in-la,v, Felice W. and Maria Gigliotti, to t4e re-
spondent, Albergo, wa·s dated August 22, 19'27, and due 
five years after the date or August 22, 1932. (Exhibit 
''A'') 
8. ·The pres-ent action was commenced by the filing 
of a complaint on the 1st day of September, 19H9 or more 
than six years .after the note se,cured by the mortgage in 
favor of Albergo became due and more than six year·s 
after the last payment of either princi'J)al or interest 
thereon. As against the .appellant the note and mort-
gage is harred ;by the statute of limitations. 
9. ·The respondent, Albergo, has known the ap-
pellant, Stella Felice Gigliotti, ''since about the tin1e 
she has been married'' to Rosario or Ros·s Gigliotti. 
(Tr. pp. 49-9!5; Abs. p. 64) 
· Note: As stated above, the evidence shows that the 
appelhtnt was married to Ross Gigliotti on June 1, 1929 
ani! immediately thereafter moved into poss·es·sion of the 
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property involved 'Yith her husband where she has .re;-
mained eYer since. 
10. ·The appellant is the mother of t'vo minor chil-
dren and the "head of the family'' as contemplated by 
the homestead law of this state~ 
!This action is one to quiet title and the c.om,plain~ 
(Tr. p. 1; .A:bs. pp. 1-4) is in the ordinary form for su-ch 
action and in the main prays that appellant's interest 
in the property be determined by a. deeree of ~Co:urt. 
By answer and counter-claim (Tr. p. 4; Abs. pp. 4-10) 
the respondent sets up that he is the ·owner of the prop-
erty 'by reason of the foreclosure ·proceedings above re-
ferred to and the subsequent ·sale of the property to ·him 
by reas.on thereof and by reason of the fact that the 
plaintiff, vvhile not made a party to the foreclosure suit, 
allegedly sat idly iby from the time of the commencement 
of that action until the filing of the present suit without 
asserting her rights and by reason thereof is estopped 
from claiming any interest in the property. By way of 
reply (Tr. p. 20; Ahs. pp. 21-2:5) ap·pellant pleaded 
the fact that ·she was not made a party to the foreclosure 
suit; that she had an interest in the property as the wi~e 
of Ross Gigliotti; that she cl"aimed a homestead exemp-
tion and- tha~ Albergo's pre~sent claim, if any, by reason 
of the note and . mortgage in his favor was ba.rred by 
the statute of limitations. 
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s:T·ATE1M·E'N'T O·F E.R.RO,RJS RE,LIED UP\ON~ 
1. ·The .first assignment .of error challenges the suf-
:Qyiency of respondent's .answer and counterclaim as a 
pr·ope;r 'pleading. The gist of appellant's action is that 
her equity of redemption was not cut off by the fore-
closure suit .and- the answer and counterclaim of the re-
spondent admits that appellant was not made a party 
defendant to the foreclosure ·suit and does not affirma-
tively state any fact that would estop her fr;om now as-
s·erting her right or interest to the property involved. 
2. Assignmeints of errors 5 to 16, both inclusive, and 
assignments 18, 20, 21, inclusive, and assignments 23 to 
·27, both inclusive all pertain to the theory or subjec!t 
m&tter as stated ahove in paragraph 1. Assignm.ents 
2, ,3, and 4 are directed to the propriety of rulings of the 
CouJ"t on the introduction of evidence and particularly 
to the Court's exclusion of testim·ony which might have 
dev.el.o:ped the fact that Albergo in fact knew that ap-
pellant was in -possession of the real property and was 
the wife of Ross Gigliotti before the commencement of 
his forecl0:sure proceedings . 
. 3 ... .Assignments 17, 19, 22 and 28 are all directed to 
specific portions ·of the Findings of F'act that are ·claimed 
not to be supported by, but are contrary to the evidenee, 
and vvithout such fi·ndings Albergo would not be entitled 
to prevail either on his answer or counterclaim. 
4~ Assignment .o:f ·error 37, in . addition to what 
has ,been heretofore .stated, points out that appellant is 
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not only the record O\Yner of the property involved, but 
that she ba's an interest therein by reason of her marital 
status and her claim of hon1estead exemption; that she 
did not practic.e any fraud or deceit or c:ollusion; and tlhat 
any claim that respondent might have by way of his 
alleged mortgage is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, and by assignment of error 37, it is point-
ed out that the c·ourt failed to determine or otherwise 
fix or define the equity or right of redemption that a.p-
pellant might have in the real property involv-ed herein. 
QUE.S'TLON·S INVO,LV·ED. 
1. It being eonceded that a married man ha,s an in-
terest in real property inferior to the rights of a. mort-
gagee, what effect does a foreclosure have upon the 
rights of the wife in p·ossession of the property at the 
time .o.f the foreclosur·e~ 
·2. Does .a wife have the right to aBsert and have 
determined in her behalf a home.stead exemption without 
her interest in real property having been previously 
terminated by contract or foreclosure~ 
3. Is not Albergo, the respondent, hound by the 
evidence produced by him on cross examination of ap-
pellant to the effect that prior to the foreclosure suit 
she was occupying the property under elaim of title~ 
4. In an action to quiet title, should not all interests 
be determined, even though such interests might be less 
than that of a. fee simple title bolder~ 
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5. Whether or not the -appellant 1s . estopped . a.s 
claimed by the respondent from asserting any interest 
in the property in question. 
ARGUMENT. 
The ultimate question to be determined in the case 
a.t lbar is the interest, if any, of the appellant in and to 
the real property des-cribed in her complaint on file 
herein. The complaint is in the ordinary form pertain-
ing to actions to quiet title to real property as c.ontemp-
lated by Title 104, ~Chapter 57, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933. This· chapter enlarges the an-cient· jurisdiction . of 
courts of equity with respect to suits to quiet title and 
to determine adverse claim1s. The first section reads : 
.i' 
\-. 
' 'An action. may be brought by any person 
against another who ·claims· an estate or interest 
in real property a.dvers.e to him for the pu.rpose 
of deterrninring suoh adverse claim-.". (Italies ours) 
Any in teres.t in proper.ty apd even possession alone 
18. sufficient to -lnaintain the Etction. See w ey v. Salt 
. ' . . . 
Lake City, 35 Utah 504, 101 Pac. 381; ·Colu.mbia Trust Co. 
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v. Nielsolfl., 76 Utah 129, 287 Pae. 92~6; and Robins v. 
Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 Pac. (2d) 340. 
The respondent in this action \Vas the purchaser at 
a sheriff sale on foreclosure of a real estate mortgage 
of the property involved. It makes no difference in this 
action that the purchaser \va.s the original mortgagee in 
the foreclosure proceedings, those proceedings having 
been introduced in evidence as appellant's Exhibit "A'', 
and in which action the appellant was omitted as a. party 
defendant. It is a fundamental principle of la.w and 
one that does not need citation of authorities to the effect 
that a purchaser at a sheriff's sale on foreclosure is not 
an innocent purchaser for value, but ta:kes title subject 
to all apparent rights of parties in poss·ession and the 
rights of others not made parties to the foreclosure suit 
who have :of record a~n equity of redemption. In using 
the term ''·of record,'' we mean actual notice· of a claim-
ant subs-equent to the original J?-Ortgagor and also con-
structive notice of a claim sueh as i:s imparted under our 
law by recording or actual p:arssession under claim of 
title, either subsequent or prior to the execution of the 
mortgage. 
The general rule with respect to the lack of necessity 
of intervention i·s stated in 19 R. C. L. 557, S·e~ction 363, 
in the following language: 
''And a wife is not _ estopp·ed by her mere 
silence from afterwards asserting her rights, 
where lan·d in fact .belonging to her, but supposed 
to lbelong to her bus band, is sold under deeree 
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of foreclosure, the wife not having been served 
in the suit; nor is she to· be rega·rded as having 
ratified the •proceedings by the acceptance of a 
part. of the purchase money· of the sale, but in 
such ease must be·taken to have acted as the agent 
-of and subject to the control of her huS'band. '' 
·The ·ease cited by the text is that of Fahie v. Pressey, 
2 Ore. 23, 80 Am. D·ec. 401. In this ·case the holder of the 
mortgage obtained his decree of foreclosure against the 
husband only and then after the sale discovered that the 
title to the property was in the name o~ the wife, who 
thereafter set up a claim t:o. the property. The complain-
ant bought the -premises at the sale and then filed a bill 
--. ;~, 
in equity to foreclose the wife's interest in the property 
alleging that her interest was merely nominal; that she 
had full knowledge of all the proceedings and the fact 
that the property was advertised ·as that of her hus-
band; that she suffered it to be sold as such and with 
full kno-wledge that the property had been so sold re-
c-eived a part of the proGeeds of the sale and ratified the 
sa1ne. In this case the com'Plainant, Fahie, was in the 
same position tha_t the defendant, Albergo, is in in the 
case at :_\·bar. The •eomplainant took the position that 
equity. should relieve him of the ·consequences of h!s 
n1istake in not making the wife a party to the foreclosure 
suit. To this a~gument the court said: 
···-: ' 'A large proportion of the misfortunes . of 
. .-;\~U i·i. life are: not· so much attrilbutable to the superior 
.:; 1;·~j~(t.: saga,citi or overreaching unscrupulousness of one 
~ s->-n ·.class a!s to the blind folly a.nd riegligen,ce of anoth-
.- .<.J ·; ,_ er ... 'Litigation 'vould never end were courts to 
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undertake to restore the equilibrium of right be-
tvYeen all such parties. ·To entitle a party to re-
lief in such cases, the facts must not only be ma-
terial, but must be such that he could not with 
reasonable diligence haYe obtained knowledge of 
them. ''"'"here there is neither accident nor mis-
tnke, fraud nor 1nisrepresentation, equity affords 
no relief to a party on the ground that he has lost 
his remedy at la \Y through In ere ignorance of a 
fact, the knovvledge of \Yhic.h might have, been ob-
tained by due diligence and inquiry : Willard's 
Eq. Jur. 70.'' 
l. As to the contention that Mrs. Pressey was estopped, 
the court cited the Tenn. case of Crenshaw v . .Anthony, 
Mart. & Y. 110, and the case of Ba.nk of United Sta.tes v. 
Lee, 13 Pet. 107, and the court said: 
''In both of these ~cases, the o bliga,tion of the 
\Yife to dis,close her interest in the property being 
dealt \vith by the husband as his own, came direct-
ly under revie-w· and in both her silenee was a p-
IJlroved on the express ground of her marital re-
lation ; and that she had done no affirmative act 
to mislead or draw in a creditor to trust her hus-
iband. But it is said that Penna P'ressey, having 
notice of all these proceedings, by receiving a 
part of the proceeds of the sale, ratified it, and 
it vvould be a fraud on her p!art no\v to gainsay 
it. It might be ans,vered to this-. if it were in 
. connection with other than a legal proceeding-. 
that she must be presumed to have acted as the 
agent of and subject to the -control· of her· hus-
band. We are of the opinion that she, having no 
legal noti·ce, had no noti,ce at all, and as to any 
interest, nominal or real, of hers, the proceedings 
of the court and the sale under the dec.ree were 
a nullity. There is no attempt to show that, 
at the time the deed "\vas made to the . wife, the 
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husband was in debt, and the deed in fraud of 
-creditors; and if he vvere not, he might well pro-
cure a -conveyance to her for her separate use, 
and the la\v will uphold it until fraud is shown." 
As t~o the· necessity of joining the wife in the fore-
closure action, the court stated: 
''The most important and decisive question 
remains to be considered. The bill expressly 
sta:tes that, after the sale, the title to the prem~ 
tses sold vvas found to be in the name of Penna 
Pressey, .vvho was made a. party to the original 
suit. Was she rightfully joined~ If so, then serv-
ice upon· her was a necessity to confer any po,ver 
on the court to deal 'vith her interest in the con-
troversy. If she were not a. necessary party to 
the suit, and had no interest to bind, although 
more a. party to the bill, the serviee might be 
omitted. But it is stated that the legal title was 
in his wife; nor does it ·change the result to say 
: that her interest is merely nominal. ~She being 
the legal owner ;of the estate, which by la'v she 
might be, the legal title could be divested out of 
her only· in two vvays : by her own act ·and by act 
· of law; that is, the proceeding of. a court having 
: competent jurisdiction of the subject of the suit. 
-.She, being the legal.owner of the property, before 
any pr.oceeding could affect her interests, nominal 
or. rea.l, must have he en made a party to the h~ll, 
1 
have been duly served with pro.cess·, and thus 
given the ·Opportunity, by legal forms, of showing 
. her rig1J.ts, whatever: they were .. Not having been 
served iri the foreelosure suit, the proceedings as 
to her were a nullity." 
In the case a.t bar .Mrs. Gigliotti did nothing affirma-
tively th~t would ~c:onstitute an estoppel on her part. The 
most that .can be said is that knowing of the fore.closure 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
proceeding she remained ~ilent as to her interest in the 
property. The Ptessey ease and the ease of Barnk- of 
[T-n:-ited Stales r. Lee, cited by the Ptessey case, sta.tes 
the general rule to the effect that although the wife is 
silent, her mere silenee does not estop her from later 
djsclosing her interest in the property. 
17 Am. Jur., Section 80 on the subject of dower does 
not support the theory that t'he appellant is estopped at 
this time to ·claim any interest in the property. The text 
clearly states the general law to the effe-c.t that no estop-
pel may be predicted on the mere silence of a .widow or 
a wife. 
There is nothing in the rec.ord to indicate that Mrs. 
Gigliotti attempted to de·ceive or defraud the resp,ondent 
in any particular. The respondent knew of the marital 
status betvveen Ro~s Gigliotti a~nd the appellant in this 
action. He also knew that the appellant was residing 
on the property at the time of his foreclosure suit. Mere 
possession under the circumstances would put the re-
S'pondent on notice of any claims that Mrs. Gigliotti had 
in or to the property. He made no inquiry as to her 
rights in the premises and yet he had constructive notice 
of them. It would be ano-malous indeed if under the cir-
.r~umstan•ces the rule of estoppel would ap.ply. That such 
a rule does not apply is clearly shown by the authorities 
indica ted a.bove." 
The a:ppellant · has three ·separate claims to·' the 
property: 
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· :First: The appellant is the head of. a family, con-
templa:ted by Title 28, Revised Statut.es of Utah, 1933, 
dealing with homesteads. Her reply in the case indicates 
the claim of homestead upon her part and which claim 
can be raised at any time. The claim of homestead goes 
to the right, title and interest of the husband, Ross Gig-
liotti; in the contra:ct of sale entered into with his parents 
as . sellers and himself as purchaser on the 31st day of 
August, 1931 a;nd which contra~ct was recorded the same 
year and long prior to the foreclosure proceeding. The 
Supren1e Court in the case of Albergo v. Gigliotti, et a!l., 
supra, held that this contract was a valid and subsisting 
contract between the parties, with an over-abundance of 
vitality-so much s-o that Ross Gigliotti was precluded 
from claiming the property by reason of a tax deed, 
which the court will recall was one o.f the issues raised 
in the fore~closure suit. 
,seeond: ·The a:ppeHant has an inchoate statutory 
interest in the .property and in the equity represented 
by the-.contract of sale above mentioned. 
Third: 'The appellant is the fee simple owner of 
the property by reason of the quit claim deed executed 
on the 17th day of July, 1937 from her mother-in-law, 
father-in-law and husband. This deed was introduced 
in evidence· in the trial of this case by the defendant on 
cross e~amination o.f the plaintiff and its authenticity 
was .~ever attacked or questioned. 
On the l,ast two p·ropositions the following authori-
ties are, we believe, in point : 
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Wi-ltsie on .Mortgage .Foreclosure, Third 
Edition, Vol. 1. Quoting Section ·, 155, 
p. 2•28: 
"It has become a settled rule of law, in all 
states where the common-lavv doctrine of do,ver 
remains unchanged, and in many states vvhere 
statutes haYe preS'cribed a 'vife 's rights in the teal 
estate of her husband, that the inchoate right of 
dozcer of a. zuife in the la.n.ds of her husbi(J;nd is a 
real and e.rist-ing interest, and as much entitled 
to protection as the vested rights of a wido'v; 
and that n-either earn) be i.ntpaired by avny judicial 
procePding to zchich the wife or ttvidow is not 
rnade a pa.rty. As such rights constitute an interest' 
in real estate, it is plain that a ·wife or widow 
must be made a party to a foreclosure suit where 
she has signed the mortgage, released her rights 
otherw·ise, or acqu.ired those rights subsequent to 
the exe;c·u.tion .of the mortgage. The rig·ht of a 
wife to be end otV"ed of an equity of redemptiovn 
has long been put al rest. She is am absolu.tely 
necessary pa1rty to a;n action in order t-o p~roduce 
such a title as a purcJhaser at the -sale ~vill be com-
pelled to accept. * * * In those states where 
the statutes provide for homesteads for the heads 
of families the wife of the mortgagor of la.nd oc-
cupied and claimed by him as a homestead is a 
necessary party to the foreclosure of the m·ort-
ga_ge and to an action of ejectment by the pur-
chaser at the sale thereunder, although the mort-
gage is given for purchase money. And in those 
cases where a married man has filed a de·claration 
of homestead on his mortgaged premises, his wife 
is a necessary party :defendant. in fore-clo·sure; 
and if she is not made a party, the pu~c:haser at 
the foreclosure sale is not entitled to a writ of 
assistance against her hus·band. '' (Italics ours). 
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Sloa,ne v. Lu,ca~s, et a.Z., 79 Pac. 949, ('Vash.) 
''Subsequently to the execution of the n1ort-
gage, and prior to the bringing of the· foreclosure 
suit, the mortgagors conveyed the mortgaged land 
. to James F. Sloane, who, by· the terms of the con~ 
veyance, assumed. the payn1en t of the mortgage. 
The said James F. Sloane \Vas· at the time the 
husband of I~da H. ~Sloane, a:nd the two were 
husband and wife when the foreclosure suit was 
· brought. Ida H. iSl'oane · was not made a party 
defendant in the foreclosure suit. De~c:ree of fore-
closure was rendered, and the land was sold there-
under to one Henry C. Townsend, who \vas then 
the holder of the mortgage. * * * 
''The said foreclosure sale was void, within 
the rule . dec1:ared by former decisions of this 
·court, for failure to 111ake party defendant the 
vvife who was a. mem;ber of the co1nmunity hold-
ing the legal ti tie to the land.'' 
N ortJluwestern Tru.st Co. v. Ry'arn, 
132 N. W. 202, (Minn.)-Quoting from 
p. 203: 
'·'·The first conte:ntion of the plaintiff is \vith-
out merit. It is the e-stablished law of this state 
that a :wife may redeem the lands of her husband 
fr0:m a foreclosure sale. Such redemption is per-
mitted for the proteetion of her rig4t, inchoate 
thou~h it may be, tn the la:nd. A redemption by 
·her in effect· annuls the sale, leaving the property 
in the same condition as if· the mortgage never 
: . had. heen made. On. principle this rule is no~t af-
. feeted by the fa{~t that the husband acquires the 
. fee of land subject to a. .purchase- money mort-
.··· gage. · · In suich case t'he wife has her inchoate 
'•'dower right in the land. Such right may he lost 
: ;by foreclosure of the mortgage. · If a foreclosure 
· saJe is ma.de, she ma.y preserve her right by re-
deeming from the sale. 
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'• The \Yife not hn Ying been made a party to 
the suit, her equity of redeinption is not limitc~d 
or determined by the decree.'' 
J( ursheedt, ct al., v. Union· D'i1ne Savings 
lnst., 23 N. E. 473, (Ne\Y York)__..Quot-
ing- fron1 p. 4 7 4: 
''The grantee, Sandford, in the conveyance 
made by Clark, \Yas served, and so far as he was 
concerned the failure to serve Clark had no im-
portanc-e, ,and its ·only .conseque~nce has relation t~o 
~Irs. Sandford, and the effect of the foreclosure 
a·ction, the decree, and its execution, if executed, 
upon her alleged inchoate right of dower in the 
premises. Assuming, as we may for the purposes 
of this review, that such right existed when the 
foreclosure action was ~commenced, it was the sub-
ject of her protection by ·means of defense or any 
other a.dequa~te remedy until lawfully barred. * 
* * The right of dower is not de-rived from the 
husband. It is a right .at ·c:ommon law, and arises 
lby reason of the marriage and by operation of 
law. It is a right which attaches on the land when 
the seisin and the marriage relation are concur-
rent, and such is the effect of the statute. * * * 
When it was essential, under an ·early statute of 
this state, to determine the relation of the wife 
to the grant made of la:nd to her husband, it was 
held that the wife's inchoate right of dower vest-
ed at the moment of the grant to the husband; 
and that she took such right constructively as 
purchaser from the grantor. * * * And, in-
asmuch as Mrs. \S:andford did not derive her in-
choate right of dower from her husband, .the fact 
that he was a party defendant to the foreclosure 
n·ction did not ope-rate to. bar or defeat her right 
of redemption.'' 
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.42 C. J. ~ Section 157 4, ·P· ·5.3-: 
''The vlife of the grantee of an equity' of 
redemption in lands subject to a ~mortgage is a 
necessary party to an action. against the grantee 
for fo-reclosure of the mortgage, hut the judgment 
is no~. void f:or the failure to IIl.ake her a party.'' 
Ca.rlquist v. Co'ltharp,' :~· 
. ~ I, . 
. ·248 .PaG. 481, (Utah). Quoting at page 
':' : 485: 0 
· '''·Louise Jens-en, being the o\vner of the legal 
title, ~~a.s entitled by reason of her interest in the 
pren1ises to redeem from the f.oreclo~sure sale at 
least that p.art of the premises to which she held 
title .. Her right to redeem would not expire until 
··· .. she had had her day in court or until some judg-
., .. mea1t .or. decree had been entered terminating such 
, . right, 9r at lea~t fixing a time when her right to 
·:redeem :would termina,te, and that, as we under-
·' stand ,the··court's order, is its legal effect. * * * 
,., Louise Jensen :by reason of the conveyance 
to .her, had the· right to redeem froJU the fore-
Qlosure sale. Her right of redemption was equal 
i:ri time to the right of any other pe-rso-n entitled 
to ·redeem, namely six months from the date of 
. the foreclosu-re sale, if she was a party to the 
pro·ee~diiJ.gs then pendin.g and had been served 
;· with. process. The duration of her right, or the 
· time in which she ·is entitled to redeem, could not 
. be curtailed or shortened by any order the court 
: . might at a subsequent date ma.iJre. '' 
:on the question .of the . statute of limitations, the 
U~ah ·'case of Boucofski v. Ja.cobson, 36 Utah 165, 104 
Pa!c. 117, is conclusive on the point that one claiming 
titl~ to : 9r .an interest in or a lien on. realty :rn.a.y invoke 
t:he; st~tute ·Of limitations as against a prior claim~nt 
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'"hen the latter'~ claim ha ~ been barred by the statute 
of lin1ita tions. 
Quoting fro1n -:1-.:l (~. J., 1ll orfga{}es, Sect :on 
1;)()7' p. 50: 
"If the mortg·agor, after the execution of the 
mortgage, Inakes a. ·c.onveya:nee of the mortgaged 
property, and the conveyance is not reeorded be-
fore foreclosure proceedings are commenced, and 
the mortgagee is not noti~fied of the grantee's 
interest, by his being· in possession or otherwise, 
such grantee need not be made a defendant, and 
a judgment against the mortgagor is .conclusive 
agains.t him. ' ' · 
Under the authorities above mentioned the appellant 
was a necessary party to the foreclosure suit and not 
having been made a party defendant her right of redemp-
tion has neYer been terminated and as to her the foreclo-
sure proceedings are void. It is earnestly contended that 
this court should .and n1ust determine the equities, rights 
and interests of the appellant in and to the prop·erty 
des·cribed in the complaint as against the respondent, 
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, a sale ha.d in pro-
eeed~ngs in which the appellant was not made a party. 
It is contended that appellant is now entitled, by reason 
of the quit claim deed introduced in evidence by the re-
spondent himse·lf on ·cross examination, a.nd by reason 
of the expiration of the statute of limitations as well as 
her inchoate and homes.tead rights to the decree .prayed 
for. 
By rc~a son of the unusual turn of events at the trial 
of this ('.allRP a:n extensive brief on some of the matters 
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origi1~ally relied upon by way of reply are unnecessary. 
It will be reinem·bered that 'the respondent' introduced a 
deed in. evidence dated prior to tlhe commencement of the 
: ', ,( ' .· . ' 
for~cl~·sure .suit .. ~his deed wa~ from the t'vo elderly Gig:-
liotties .and Ross Gigli<?tti. to the appellant and rnvolved 
the property in question. 
· Having introduced the deed in evidence the respond-
ent made no att~mpt to atta,ck its authenticity and, there-
fore, we have a situation where the appellant is, by the 
respondent's own evide:nce, a ·purchaser of the property 
for value before notice of the pendency of any action and 
is in a position to inVtoke the statute of limitations, there 
being .no privity of contract between she and her 
grantors. 
That a wife ·can raise the statute of limitations upon 
a no:te which even she ha.s signed with her husband and 
where it is not shoWn that her husband wa.s acting as her 
age:nt in making payments is -clearly held in the ease of 
Hallow:a.y v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45 P:ac. ('2d) 56·5 . 
. So far as the homestead laws are concerned, the 
matter is purely statutory coming under Title 38 of our 
Revised Codes of Utah, 1933. It would be a matter of 
supererogation to quote these various statutes, but the 
cases of Panagopu.Zos v. Ma:rwning, 9·3 U.tah 198, 69 Pac. 
(:2d) 614; Uta.h Builders Supply Com(pany v. Gardrner, 
86 Utah 257, 42 Pac. (2d) 989, and Williams v. Peterson, 
86 Utah 5·2~6, 46 P'ac. (2d) 674, all indicate the broad ef-
fe.ct give:n our statute hy the Supreme Court. The weak-
ness of respondent's position is very clearly shown in 
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his effort to discredit the n1arriage be.t,veen the appellant 
and her husband and in the fact that the evidence is un-
disputed that he, the respondent, kne"~ tha:t the appellant 
"~as residing on .the property at the time of his fore-
closure suit and holding herself out as the vvife of Ross 
Gigliotti and yet he failed to make her a party to the 
same. 
The problems involved are very clear and simple. 
We submit that appellant should have judgment as 
prayed for in her ·eomplaint and in her reply, bearing in 
mind the amendment to the reply permitted by the c:ourt 
which amendment pertained to the deed produced and 
intr~oduced in evidence by the respondent himself. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARLEY W. GusTIN, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
arnd Appella.nt. 
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